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Abstract 
 
This paper assesses an argument against the representationalist tradition in 
anthropology: the tradition of reporting how a cultural group represents the 
world. According to the argument, anthropologists working within this 
tradition cannot take the concepts of those they study seriously. I defend the 
representationalist tradition against this argument. 
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Introduction 
There is a tradition in anthropology of informing us 
about how a group represents the world. An anthropologist 
studies a group as part of their fieldwork and tells us about how 
that group represents the world. For example, E. Evans-
Pritchard studied the Azande and told us that the Azande make 
assertions which imply that witchcraft is a real phenomenon 
(Evans-Pritchard 1976, 244). In doing so, they represent the 
world as if there is witchcraft. 
The authors of the Introduction to a book entitled 
Thinking Through Things, Amiria Henare, Martin Holbraad 
and Sari Wastell, make an argument against this tradition.1 
Their argument is as follows. If anthropology provides us with 
information about how different groups of people represent the 
world, the question arises as to which representations are 
correct: which representations, if any, identify what there really 
is? There is no option for the anthropologist except to take the 
sciences as identifying what there is (Henare et al. 2007, 11). 
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But then an anthropologist will generally have to say that the 
people they are studying use some concepts in their 
representations which do not refer to anything real. Perhaps 
there are exceptions, for instance if the people studied by an 
anthropologist are scientists or have a worldview that is 
profoundly influenced by science. But for most groups, the 
anthropologist will have to say that these groups rely on at 
least some concepts which do not refer to anything real, such as 
the concept of witchcraft. To say this is to not take the concepts 
of others seriously, when anthropologists should be taking 
these concepts seriously. 
We can break this argument down into four premises, 
which together entail a conclusion against the representa-
tionalist tradition of anthropology – the tradition of an 
anthropologist telling us about how a group represents the 
world. Here are the four premises: 
(1) An anthropologist studying a group of people should take all 
the concepts of this group seriously. 
(2) If the anthropologist aims to inform us about how the group 
they are studying represents the world, then the anthropologist 
must take our scientific culture as identifying what there 
actually is in the world. 
(3) If the anthropologist takes our scientific culture as identifying 
what there actually is in the world, then aside from certain 
exceptional cases, they imply that at least some of the concepts 
used by the group they are studying do not refer to anything 
real. 
(4) If the anthropologist implies that some of the concepts used 
by the group they are studying do not refer to anything real, 
then the anthropologist is not taking these concepts seriously. 
From these premises we can deduce the following 
conclusion: aside from certain exceptional cases, an 
anthropologists working within the representationalist 
tradition cannot take all the concepts of a group they are 
studying seriously, when this is what they should do. Here I 
wish to defend this tradition, which I think is mistakenly being 
devalued. Although a conclusion against it follows from these 
premises, some of the premises are very questionable.2 In this 
paper, I object to premises (2) and (4). I object mostly by 
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drawing upon research and considerations that are already 
familiar to anthropologists. In the course of discussing these 
premises, textual evidence will be provided that the argument 
above is being made. 
 
Premise (2) 
Recall the content of premise (2): if an anthropologist 
aims to inform us about how a group they are studying 
represents the world, then the anthropologist must take our 
scientific culture as identifying what there actually is in the 
world. In this premise ‘the world’ means reality and it is 
supposed by anthropologists with this aim that there is just one 
world. The relevant part of our scientific culture consists of 
those propositions currently regarded as established within 
biology, chemistry, physics and other sciences. (I am not sure if 
the social and psychological sciences ought to be included in 
this list, but what is said below can survive different readings 
of the scope of science.) According to premise (2), the 
anthropologist with the aim of informing us about how a group 
they are studying represents the world must accept the 
following point: those propositions which are currently regarded 
as established within the sciences succeed in identifying what 
there is. They must accept this point in the sense that, if they 
are to be consistent, they must not deny it or say anything that 
implies a denial of it. 
The following quotation provides textual evidence that 
the authors of the Introduction to Thinking Through Things are 
committed to premise (2): 
For, if cultures render different appearances of reality, it 
follows that one of them is special and better than all the 
others, namely the one that best reflects reality. And since 
science – the search for representations that reflect reality as 
transparently and faithfully as possible – happens to be a 
modern Western project, that special culture is, well, ours. 
(Henare et al. 2007, 11) 
According to the authors, if an anthropologist supposes 
that there is a single world which is represented differently by 
different cultural groups, they are committing themselves to 
our scientific culture providing the best representations of this 
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world. As I understand the authors, the claim that our scientific 
culture has the best representations of reality is a claim not 
just that the established representations within this culture are 
better than representations from all other cultures for 
identifying what there is, which may not be such a great thing 
if the other cultures are especially bad at this, but also that 
these established representations are the best in that they 
achieve the goal of identifying what there is. On this reading, 
the quotation is evidence for premise (2). 
The main objection to this premise is that it seems 
entirely consistent for an anthropologist to report how some 
group represents the world yet deny that our scientific culture 
identifies what there is in this world. To illustrate this point: 
there is clearly a contradiction in saying, “The Azande 
represent the world as if there is witchcraft and it is not the 
case that the Azande represent the world as if there is 
witchcraft.” But there is no apparent contradiction in saying, 
“The Azande represent the world as if there is witchcraft and 
our scientific culture does not have authority over whether this 
representation is correct.” An anthropologist who tells us that 
the Azande represent the world in this way might very well 
think that there is witchcraft and also that current science is 
mistaken if it says otherwise. They might be wrong to think 
this, but as far as I can see they are not logically inconsistent. 
Talking about how others represent the world does not logically 
entail that current science provides the best account of this 
world. Such talk is neutral on this issue (see Frazer 1913, 1). 
In response to this objection, it may be said that 
although the representationalist anthropologist can reject 
science as a guide to what there is without logical 
inconsistency, there are no plausible alternatives to giving 
science this role. But there are plausible interpretations of the 
relationship between science and reality apart from the realist 
interpretation, and below I shall present one. By the realist 
interpretation, I mean the interpretation according to which 
our current scientific culture is successful to a significant 
degree in identifying what there is. (It is called the ‘realist’ 
interpretation purely because it asserts that the sciences 
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reveal reality, and not because the interpretation is more 
likely to be correct.) 
Suppose, for the sake of argument, that reality is divided 
into kinds of things in a certain way, regardless of what human 
beings believe. Even if we go so far as to suppose this, there is 
room for doubt over whether science identifies these kinds of 
things. For it is conceivable that a scientific theory is successful 
in terms of its predictions and the puzzles it can solve without 
the concepts of this theory picking out the independently 
existing kinds. (See the quotation from Thomas Kuhn below in 
support of this point.) And we can conceive of other theories 
that are equally successful at predicting and puzzle-solving yet 
rely on incompatible accounts of what these kinds are (e.g. 
Liggins and Daly 2013, 606). In light of these points, one might 
think of established scientific theories as successful in these 
respects while remaining neutral over whether the concepts 
involved in scientific theories identify the kinds of things that 
there are. This is a plausible competitor to the realist 
interpretation of science. 
Note that it was the representationalist tradition itself 
which promoted this other interpretation. Consider what Kuhn 
says in his Postscript to The Structure of Scientific Revolutions: 
A scientific theory is usually felt to be better than its predecessors 
not only in the sense that it is a better instrument for discovering 
and solving puzzles but also because it is somehow a better 
representation of what nature is really like… [As] a historian, I am 
impressed with the implausibility of the view. I do not doubt, for 
example, that Newton’s mechanics improves on Aristotle’s and that 
Einstein’s improves on Newton’s as instruments for puzzle-solving. 
But I can see in their succession no coherent direction of ontological 
development. On the contrary, in some important respects, though by 
no means in all, Einstein’s general theory of relativity is closer to 
Aristotle’s than either of them is to Newton’s. (Kuhn 1996, 206-207) 
It may be said that Kuhn is appealing here to history 
not to anthropology. Historical research into how scientists 
have represented the world casts doubt on the realist 
interpretation of science. My response to this point is that 
anthropology also played an important role in casting doubt 
on the realist interpretation of science by asserting the 
possibility of incompatible yet equally pragmatically 
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successful theories. Benjamin Lee Whorf famously claimed 
that Hopi words for describing reality presuppose a certain 
theory, and that these words adequately meet their needs for 
conveying information, yet the theory presupposed is 
incompatible with the theory which Western languages 
presuppose. He invites us to think of these theories as 
comparable to scientific theories (Whorf 1950, 67). 
The authors of the Introduction show awareness of this 
alternative to the realist interpretation of science, but they do 
not regard it as a genuine alternative. They briefly dismiss it, 
in a way that I find hard to understand. They say that an 
anthropologist who advocates it must commit themselves to the 
words of others being translatable, and so the anthropologist 
privileges their own representations as much as the person who 
takes Western science as revealing reality (2007: 11-12). I 
cannot see how the ‘and so’ follows here. Furthermore, there is 
only a translatability commitment in a very weak sense: 
representationalists write as if that they can, to a valuable 
degree, convey what others have said by providing sufficiently 
long explanations. Representationalists do not have to treat the 
concepts of others as combinations of Western concepts. 
 
Premise (4) 
Recall the content of premise (4): if an anthropologist 
implies that some of the concepts used by the group they are 
studying do not refer to anything real, then the anthropologist 
is not taking these concepts seriously. Here we can simplify a 
little and understand concepts as the meanings of individual 
words. For example, the word ‘witch’ in its literal use has a 
meaning and this meaning is the concept of a witch. To be 
familiar with this meaning is to have the concept of a witch. 
The quotation below is textual evidence in favour of 
attributing premise (4) to the authors of the Introduction, 
though its content needs some unpacking in order for this to 
be apparent: 
[…] our concepts (not our ‘representations’) must, by definition, be 
inadequate to translate different ones. This, it is suggested, is the 
only way to take difference – alterity – seriously as the starting 
point for anthropological analysis. One must accept that when 
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someone tells us, say, that powder is power, the anthropological 
problem cannot be that of accounting for why he might think that 
about powder (explaining, interpreting, placing his statement into 
context), but rather that if that really is the case, then we just do 
not know what powder he is talking about. (Henare et al. 2007, 12) 
This quotation focuses on the example of Cuban diviners 
who say that a particular kind of powder they use is their 
divinatory power. The quotation expresses an opposition to two 
ways of responding to the Cuban diviners. Firstly, an 
anthropologist should not say that the diviners use entirely 
familiar concepts to us but make false representations with 
them: saying that this powder is divinatory power, when it is 
not. Secondly, an anthropologist should not commit to the 
following combination: (i) the Cuban diviners are working with 
an unfamiliar concept to classify some powder; (ii) to use this 
concept to classify some powder is to imply that the powder is 
divinatory power; (iii) whoever uses their concept in this way is 
making a false representation of the world, because it is just 
some powder and lacks any divinatory power. In place of these 
approaches, the authors of the Introduction recommend saying 
that the Cuban diviners live in a different world to us, a world 
in which there really is this powder that is divinatory power: 
The world in which powder is power is not an uncharted 
(and preposterous!) region of our own. It is a different world, in 
which what we take to be powder is actually power […] (Henare 
et al. 2007, 12) 
I will not provide more details about this radical 
replacement approach here, which is puzzling at first sight. 
From what has been said so far, it seems clear that the authors 
of the Introduction are against an anthropologist treating any 
concept of a group studied as both used in the group’s 
representations of what there is and as not referring to 
anything real. This for them is to not take the concept in 
question seriously. Unfortunately, the authors do not explain 
why this amounts to not taking the concept seriously.  
There are two objections I shall make to premise (4). To 
grasp the first objection, consider a certain hypothetical 
situation. You are eating some cake and someone asks you if 
they can have some too. You attribute to them a desire for cake 
and a belief that you can provide them with some. On the basis 
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of these attributions, you predict that if they are offered cake, 
they will accept the offer. Now some people think that the 
concepts of belief and desire do not actually refer to anything 
real. They think that these concepts do not refer to brain states 
and that, for an accurate understanding of what there is, we 
should replace them with scientific concepts that do refer to 
brain states (e.g. Churchland 1986, 395-399). Even if we ignore 
the concerns about scientific realism raised in the previous 
section and even if we also say that these people are right, we 
might still value the concepts of belief and desire. We might 
value these concepts as tools in prediction. Indeed, we might 
wonder whether there are any alternatives available in our 
everyday lives which are comparably good for the job of making 
predictions such as the one you make in the example. We are 
not treating these concepts as adequate means for referring to 
what there is, but are we not taking them seriously?  Since we 
value them, there is some reason to say that we are taking 
them seriously. Concepts are used not just in attempts to 
identify what there is, but also to communicate, to predict, to 
hope, to fear and more. The authors of the Introduction need 
some justification for why valuing them for one of these other 
ends is not enough to be taking them seriously, for why only 
valuing them as referrers is enough for this. I doubt that there 
is any compelling justification regarding this.  
The second objection I shall make is, more precisely, an 
objection to the combination of premise (1) and premise (4), 
rather than to premise (4) in isolation. Premise (1) tells 
anthropologists to take the concepts of those they study 
seriously. Premise (4) says that this goal cannot be achieved if 
an anthropologist says that a concept used by those studied to 
represent the world fails to refer. Premises (1) and (4) together 
entail a requirement of anthropology. The requirement is that a 
work of anthropological research should not say, “The group I 
have studied use a concept in their representations of what 
there is but this concept does not refer to anything real.” 
However, what happens if there is a disagreement within the 
group studied over whether a certain concept refers to 
something real, for instance the concept of a witch? Some 
members of the group think that this concept can be used to 
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pick out a kind of person while others think that it cannot be 
used in this way, because there are no witches. 
Anthropologists are commonly urged not to overlook diversity 
of belief within the groups they write about, so it matters to 
consider situations of this kind. 
From what the authors of the Introduction say, we can 
extract a proposal for dealing with this situation: an 
anthropologist should say that those group members who think 
that the concept refers to something real inhabit one world, a 
world in which there are witches, whereas those who think that 
the concept does not refer to anything real inhabit another 
world, a world without witches. Both parties are therefore right 
about the world in which they live. However, leaving aside 
puzzles about the very notion of different worlds, this seems to 
treat the disagreement as if it were a mere verbal confusion. If 
only parties to it understood that they are talking about 
different worlds, there would be no disagreement. For 
convenience of expression, I shall introduce a piece of 
terminology. A substantial disagreement about concept 
reference, rather than a mere verbal confusion, is a 
disagreement about whether a concept refers in which there is 
a single world that both parties are talking about and both 
cannot be right about this world: at least one party is making a 
mistake. ‘World’ here means reality. With these definitions in 
place, we can ask a question: why should an anthropologist 
prioritize taking concepts seriously, in the way required by 
premises (1) and (4), over allowing for substantial 
disagreements about concept reference? Surely we are asked to 
take the concepts of others seriously as part of respecting 
them,3 but it seems that this kind of respect comes at the price 
of respecting their disagreements about concept reference and 
no reason has been given as to why we should accept this price. 
My second objection then is that the combination of premises 
(1) and (4) does not allow anthropologists to admit that there 
are substantial disagreements over concept reference, and this 
approach has not been adequately motivated. 
It is understandable that some anthropologists made the 
argument that I have been evaluating, from a concern to 
respect the concepts of others. If the argument succeeds, it 
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would be momentous for anthropology. The objections I have 
raised do not show that the argument fails. They show that at 
present certain premises have been inadequately supported. My 
objections leave open whether those premises can be provided 
with the missing support in the future. But my impression is 
that it will be very hard to make the argument a compelling 
one. To state my impression more fully: at best, a more justified 
version of the argument will provide a stronger reason to 
pursue a different kind of anthropology, if such an anthropology 
is possible, while still being too disputable to provide a 
conclusive blow against the tradition of reporting group 
representations. 
 
 
NOTES 
 
 
1 To say that there is a tradition within anthropology of informing us about 
how a group represents the world seems to imply that there could be other 
traditions in anthropology, traditions which do not involve this. But is 
providing such information simply essential to anthropology? The argument I 
shall evaluate is made by authors who deny this essential status. I grant this 
denial here. 
2 The argument I evaluate is made as part of the ontological movement in 
anthropology. My focus is limited to this argument. I do not aim to evaluate 
the entire movement here. 
3 Readers may wonder whether debate over the argument made by Henare, 
Holbraad and Wastell is a mere repetition of earlier debates in anthropology 
over relativism. My evaluation draws upon familiar material. But to my 
knowledge, earlier relativists do not make the argument I have been 
evaluating. Furthermore, some efforts from earlier debates to explain 
relativist talk of different worlds do so in terms of a single world that is 
perceived or is conceptualized or is cognizable differently (Hollis and Lukes 
1982, 6-8; Sperber 1982, 154).  
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